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Abstract: High reliability of railway power system is one of the essential criteria to ensure quality 
and cost-effectiveness of railway services. Evaluation of reliability at system level is essential for 
not only scheduling maintenance activities, but also identifying reliability-critical components. 
Various methods to compute reliability on individual components or regularly structured systems 
have been developed and proven to be effective. However, they are not adequate for evaluating 
complicated systems with numerous interconnected components, such as railway power systems, 
and locating the reliability critical components. Fault tree analysis (FTA) integrates the reliability of 
individual components into the overall system reliability through quantitative evaluation and 
identifies the critical components by minimum cut sets and sensitivity analysis. The paper presents 
the reliability evaluation of railway power systems by FTA and investigates the impact of 
maintenance activities on overall reliability. The applicability of the proposed methods is illustrated 
by case studies in AC railways.   
Keywords:  fault tree analysis, railway power supply systems, reliability evaluation 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Electrified railway has played an important role in modern transportations and social development 
because of its huge capacity, high efficiency and low pollution. The power supply system in 
electrified railways provides continuous and adequate power of electricity to the trains in railway 
 2
operation and great impact to its operations. There are numerous inter-connecting components, in 
both AC and DC supply systems [1], with complex structure and each of them is subject to certain 
and limited lifetime. Analysing reliability and maintenance of the systems is therefore the key to 
avoid unnecessary redundancy in common power system [2]. An effective system reliability 
evaluation should quantitatively provide helpful maintenance scheduling to avoid the disturbance of 
train service and excessive maintenance costs. 
 
As for the reliability evaluation of an electrified railway system and its power supply system, there 
have been many related studies in the last decade. Fukuoka developed a network-type reliability 
evaluation model, Type State Influence Diagram, to express the complicated inter-dependency 
among subsystems [3]. Cosulich et al. applied a probabilistic approach based on stochastic reward 
nets to estimate the vehicle performance of reliability, availability and maintainability in the Italian 
Railway System [4]. Wang et al. presented an analytical evaluation of reliability of a railway 
catenary system which combines radial basis neural networks, finite element analysis with Monte 
Carlo simulation [5]. Tsang and Ho demonstrated the application of the reliability-centred 
maintenance (RCM) process to analyse and develop preventive maintenance tasks for the 25 kV 
electrical power supply system [6].  
 
There are many studies on the reliability analysis of electrical components or vehicles [7-9] but few 
on railway power supply system. Most methods based on statistical or stochastic processes are used 
in regular-structured systems, such as series-parallel, parallel-series and k -out-of- n  systems [10]. 
For complicated railway power systems, reliability analysis on the whole system is tedious and 
maintenance scheduling cannot be carried out on the basis of overall system reliability, as in the 
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usual practices. Besides, it is desirable to identify the critical components in order to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of the maintenance activities.  
 
This paper presents a new approach based on fault tree analysis (FTA) to evaluate the overall 
reliability of a railway power supply system. Through FTA, a railway power supply system is 
logically expressed by structurally interrelated components and its overall reliability is calculated 
according to the reliability of individual components and their relationship. The binary decision 
diagram (BDD) method enables efficient evaluation of the fault tree of railway power supply 
systems. The critical components, which more likely lead to failure of the whole system, are also 
located by specific importance indices. The sensitivity analysis provides hints for scheduling vital 
maintenance activities. Finally, the reliability of a railway power supply system under different 
maintenance intervals is analysed in this study. These studies are crucial to ensure reliable operation 
and effective scheduling maintenance. 
 
2 Fault tree analysis 
 
FTA is one of the most commonly used tools in reliability and risk assessment, analysing 
relationship between components failures and system failures. Bell Telephone Laboratories first 
developed the concept in 1962 for the U.S. Air Force in the Minuteman system [11]. For the next 
four decades, FTA has been successfully applied in various fields, such as nuclear systems [12-13], 
coal mine escape ways [14] and railway traffic control [15]. FTA is a top-down and graphical 
approach to failure analysis and it enables identification of the critical aspects to the possible 
failures of the systems and provision of qualitative and quantitative system reliability analysis [11].  
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2.1 Fault tree construction  
 
The three major steps of FTA are definition of the top event, construction of the fault tree and its 
evaluation [16]. The symbols shown in Figure 1(a) represent specific types of fault, normal events 
and logical gates in FTA. A fault tree is so structured that the sequence of events leading to a fault is 
denoted under the top event and the events are logically related to the fault by OR and AND gates. 
The input events to each logic gate that are also outputs of other logic gates at a lower level are 
shown as rectangle. These events are developed further until the sequence of events lead to the 
basic events which are represented as circles and diamonds on the bottom of the fault tree. Figure 
1(b) shows an example of a fault tree. 
 
2.2 Fault tree evaluation  
 
The evaluation of the fault tree can be either qualitative, quantitative, or both, depending upon the 
scope of the analysis. One of the purposes of fault tree evaluation is to determine an acceptable 
level of reliability or risk of failure the proposed system. Qualitative evaluation usually pinpoints 
the critical reasons or events causing the failure of system while quantitative evaluation determines 
the probability of the failure of system.  
 
Minimum cut set (MCS) algorithm is commonly used to carry out qualitative evaluation [17]. A cut 
set is a set of basic events whose occurrences cause the top event to occur. A cut set is minimal if it 
cannot be reduced any more and it still guarantees the occurrence of the top event. The logical 
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expression of occurrence of top event, ( )Y , is given in Eq.(1) and it is the qualitative evaluation 
or minimum cut representation.  
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where iY  is a Boolean indicator variable of basic events; 1 2, ,..., nK K K  denote the minimum 
cut sets of basic events; n  is the number of minimum cut sets;  and   represent logical AND 
and OR operators respectively. FTA facilitates the calculation of the probability of occurrence of top 
events, which is useful to rank the importance of minimum cut sets to the top event or the 
importance of the specified basic events to the top event. Quantitative evaluation is usually 
conducted based on the Inclusion-Exclusion Principle [18] and the probability of occurrence of top 
events is mathematically expressed as in Eq.(2). 
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where ( )iP K  denotes the probability of occurrence of minimum cut sets iK .  Unfortunately, 
at least 12n  terms have to be computed in Eq.(2) and the computational demands become very 
high when n  increases. There is a more feasible method to calculate the probability of top events 
based on the disjoint sum of minimum cut sets and it is described in Eq.(3).  
  1 1 2 1 2 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i n nP P K P K P K P K P K P K P K P K               (3) 
where iK  is the opposite event of iK .  
 
2.3 Importance of components and minimum cut sets 
 
There is an orderly arrangement of components or MCSs in a system. Some are more critical than 
the others in term of the functionality of the system. The arrangement of components or their MCSs 
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can be quantified by their reliability importance. There are two major advantages of measuring 
reliability importance of components or MCSs. Firstly, the critical components or MCSs are easily 
identified and hence the overall reliability can be improved with minimum cost. Secondly, efficient 
ways to diagnose system failure are provided by a maintenance order checklist [19]. Several 
common definitions of the reliability importance of components and MCSs are given in Table 1.  
 
The importance during a certain time span is defined in Eq.(4). 
             
0
( )
T
i iI I t dt                            (4) 
where ( )iI t  denotes the importance functions of the component or MCS i , T  is a certain 
time span. With this order, the sensitivity analysis of a component or MCS is possible. 
 
2.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
With the order of importance of components or MCSs, the variations of the mean-time-to-failure 
(MTTF) of the overall system can be established when MTTF of some of components in the system 
changes. Sensitivity analysis is usually used to examine such changes. The sensitivity of component 
reliability is defined as below. 
          MTTF MTTF
MTTF
                                (5) 
where MTTF  denotes the mean time to failure of system and it is defined as  
0
R t dt
 ; 
 R t  denotes the reliability of components; MTTF   is the mean time to failure of system while 
the lifetime of some of components involved is changed. 
 
3 Reliability modelling of railway power supplies 
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In electrified railway, power is transmitted to trains via DC or three-phase AC networks. A railway 
power supply system usually consists of a number of major components, such as feeding 
transformers, circuit breakers, overhead cables, insulators and bondings. These components are 
subject to excessive electrical or mechanical stress, or both.  
 
3.1 AC Railway power supplies 
 
3.1.1 Configuration 
 
The power of an AC electrified railway is obtained from utility supply system, at transmission or 
sub-transmission voltage level, through the railway feeding substations. 25kV traction network at 
50 or 60Hz is the most commonly adopted system. A rail line is usually divided into a number of 
isolated feeding systems and each section is fed by a single-phase supply from a transformer within 
the section. The power is carried to the trains through overhead catenaries and current takes the rails 
as return paths. Adjacent sections are supplied by different phases of a three-phase network and they 
are separated by track neutral. Provisions of isolators and switchgear are necessary for track neutral 
and parallel sections to enable continual feeding in cases of failures and outages by isolating certain 
faulty equipment or section or even reconfiguring to a different feeding network.  
 
3.1.2 Main components 
 
In an AC railway power supply system, the transformer substations convert power from utility 
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supply systems to railway supply systems. Numerous crucial electrical components are installed in a 
transformer substation, such as primary transformers, autotransformers (AT), inductors, switches, 
and circuit breakers. Figure 2 shows the interconnections among the crucial components in a typical 
AC supply system set-up with ATs across two feeding sections. Two primary Scott transformers 
convert the voltage to 55kV. Four autotransformers (C35-C38) provide 27.5kV traction power for 
the catenaries on both up-track and down-track. Inductors, switches and circuit breakers guarantee 
the redundancy and protection between the two Scott transformers or the two autotransformers. The 
major components are summarised in Table 2.       
 
The other crucial subsystem, catenary system, plays the role of carrying the electric power to the 
trains. There are numerous components in a practical catenary system. The main components, such 
as contact wires, messenger wires, insulators, central anchors and tension provider, are considered 
in this study. When one of these components fails, the catenary system is subject to risk of failures. 
 
3.2 Data analysis on component level 
 
Reliability data of components usually derive from two sources. The first type, observed data, is 
attained from a controlled life test and the second, field data, is observed and collected in actual 
operation. Reliability models of components are usually obtained by nonparametric or parametric 
methods. In the former, no assumption is made on reliability distribution, other than that it is 
continuous, and, in some cases, strictly increasing with respect to time. The empirical survivor 
distribution, probability plotting paper, Kaplan-Meier Estimator and Nelson’s Estimator, and the 
total time on test are the common estimation techniques which are adopted to determine the 
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reliability distribution [20]. In the latter, the common reliability distributions, such as binomial, 
Possion, exponential, Weibull, or inverse Guassian distributions, are first assumed and their 
parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood or Bayesian estimation methods [10].               
 
3.3 FTA model on system level 
 
The reliability of railway power supply systems is developed through the FTA approach. The failure 
of overall system is defined as the top event and those of components are regarded as basic events. 
The inter-relationships of the events are transmitted through the logic gates. A power supply section 
with a typical AT feeding for both up-track and down track, is modelled into a fault tree as shown in 
Figure 3. In this fault tree, four events are to be developed further into more detailed fault trees. 
They are categorised into two groups: transformer substations and catenary system. 
  
The three undeveloped events in Figure 3 that transformer substations fail are extended and the new 
fault tree is illustrated in Figure 4. From Figure 4, five gates are involved to denote the major 
failures of transformer substations. They are further extended into more detailed fault trees 
combined by basic failure events.  
     
The basic failure events of the major electrical components in transformer substations are divided in 
the following groups: 
 Failures to Scott transformers: E1, E2. 
 Failures to current mutual inductors: E3, E5. 
 Failures to ambipolar auto-switches: E7, E9, E29, E30, E33, E34. 
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 Failures to ambipolar manual switches: E13, E14, E18, E19, E20. 
 Failures to circuit breakers: E24, E25, E26. 
 Failures to three-phase manual switches: E41, E42. 
 Failures to autotransformers: E37, E38. 
  
The other undeveloped event in Figure 3 is also extended into a fault tree as in Figure 5. All major 
components in the catenary system are combined in different groups. Each group comprises of 
contact wires, messenger wires, insulators, central anchors and tension provider in series. Such 
interconnection among components always makes the system more susceptible to failure.  
  
4 Reliability evaluation 
 
For a huge and complex system like railway power supply systems, the evaluation of the reliability 
of the overall system requires substantial computational effort. In this section, an efficient algorithm, 
binary decision diagram (BDD) algorithm, is introduced to evaluate the fault tree. Reliability 
evaluations on railway power supply systems are then addressed in association of scheduling 
maintenance activities.  
 
4.1 Evaluation algorithms  
 
Comparing with the conventional methods [18] and the Sharp algorithm [21], a binary decision 
diagram (BDD) algorithm enables faster qualitative and quantitative evaluation of a fault tree 
because of its efficient construction and manipulation of structure [22-26]. The BDD method is a 
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graphical tool encoding Shannon’s decomposition [24]. It is used to not only analyse a fault tree 
through converting a fault tree to a BDD [27], but also directly encode its minimum cut sets [24]. 
The disjoint sum of minimum cut sets of a fault tree is calculated through the BDD method.  
 
4.1.1 Shannon’s decomposition 
 
The Shannon’s decomposition is defined in terms of the If-Then-Else (ITE) connective as 
represented by Eq.(6). 
                   1 0 1 0( , , )x x x xite x x x                              (6) 
    where x  is one of Boolean decision variables. The functions 1x   and 0x   are Boolean 
functions of   when 1x   and 0x  , respectively. The recursive use of ITE connectives is the 
core of the BDD algorithm that provides an important alternative to represent fault trees. The 
example fault tree in Figure 1(b) can be logically expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )a b c f h d e f g          , where the symbols   and   denote logical OR and AND 
operators respectively. Such expression is converted into the format in Eq.(7) by the recursive use 
of ITE connectives.      
( ,1, ( ,1, ( ,1, ( ,1, ( ,1, ( , ( ,1, ( ,1,0)),0))))))ite a ite b ite c ite h ite f ite g ite d ite e      (7) 
 
4.1.2 Binary decision diagram 
 
A binary decision diagram (BDD) is a directed acyclic graph [24]. It has two leaves: 0 and 1 
encoding the two corresponding constant functions. Each internal node encodes an ITE connective. 
Thus, it is labelled with a variable x  and it has two out-edges, 0-edge and 1-edge. The leaf at 
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1-edge denotes the function value when its root is 1 whilst the one at 0-edge denotes the function 
value when its root is 0. Such procedure is repeated until each leaf is set to 0 or 1. The ITE (i.e. 
Eq.(7)) is represented by a binary tree as shown in Figure 6.  
 
4.1.3 Minimum cut sets and disjoint sum 
 
With the BDD method, minimum cut sets and their disjoint sum of a fault tree can be obtained 
easily. A trace is first carried out, beginning with a leaf, set at 1, until the root. All nodes having 
1-edge constitute a minimum cut set in the trace. Similarly, the same trace is carried out to acquire 
the disjoint sum of minimum cut sets. All nodes in the trace are covered in the process and the 
nodes which have 0-edge are expressed by their opposite events. In this example of fault tree, the 
minimum cut sets are as follows: 
                | , , , , , , , ,i i sK K K a b c f h d g e g    
The disjoint sum of minimum cut sets is as follows: 
              , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,a a b a b c a b c h a b c f h a b c d f g h a b c d e f g h  
Therefore, the reliability distribution of this example fault tree is calculated through Eq.(8). 
                             
                                   
R R a R a R b R a R b R c R a R b R c R h R a R b R c R f R h
R a R b R c R d R f R g R h R a R b R c R d R e R f R g R h
    
 
  (8) 
 
In practice, a fault tree is usually constructed with a large number of basic events in a complex 
structure. It is impossible to describe its reliability distribution completely in one simple 
mathematical expression. For the convenience of further analysis, the curve fitting technique is 
adopted to approximate the real distribution of the given data points, i.e. 1 2(.) ( , ,..., ,..., )i nR F R R R R , 
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where iR  denotes the reliability of i th component, n  is the number of components in a system, 
(.)F  represents the quantitative evaluation function proposed in this study and (.)R  is the fitting 
function approximate to (.)F . This approach enables the scheduling of maintenance and repair 
works on large systems through reliability evaluation functions.  
 
4.2 Effects of maintenance activities 
 
Maintenance activities are usually categorised into two major classes: corrective and preventive. 
Corrective maintenance (CM) is the unscheduled maintenance activities to recover a system from 
failure. Preventive maintenance (PM) includes the scheduled maintenance activities carried out to 
reduce the likelihood of failures or prolong the life of the system. For railway power supply systems, 
PM is more preferred as occurrence of possible failures must be avoided. In practice, the 
maintenance interval is the most important decision variable which may determine different regimes 
of maintenance activities, such as age-dependent PM, periodic PM, failure limit or sequential PM 
[28]. Of all maintenance policies, the periodic PM is the most commonly adopted in railway power 
supply systems as regularity makes complex scheduling easier and avoids the conflicts between 
maintenance activities and train operations. A reliability model with the consideration of regular 
maintenance activities [29] is adopted in this study. Furthermore, a method to evaluate maintenance 
costs is also proposed under periodic PM. The mathematical descriptions on them are involved in 
the Appendix. 
 
5 Case studies 
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The proposed approach based on FTA is employed in the analysis of practical railway power 
systems. In this case study, the quantitative reliability of the complex systems and the 
reliability-critical components are attained through the analysis on the importance of components. 
The reliability and the corresponding cost under different maintenance intervals are computed 
accordingly. The results provide useful information for engineers to work out the maintenance 
scheduling.          
 
5.1 Set-up 
 
Two practical railway power supply sections covering 11 passengers stations and 127 km of 
double-track on the Jing-Guang mainline railway in China are employed as the test-bed. The supply 
setup is schematically represented in Figure 7. The first section between the WLB and CG 
sectioning booths is mainly supplied by the XD transformer station. The other section is supplied by 
LY transformer substation. AT feeding is adopted in the two sections with 27.5kV traction network 
at 50Hz. 
 
In order to avoid redundant descriptions, only the supply section on down-track between the WLB 
sectioning booth and the XD transformer substation is mapped on to the fault tree (i.e. the main 
tree). The transformer substation and catenary system are represented by two sub-trees. In this case 
study, two assumptions are made. The first one is that some minor components in the power supply 
system are omitted here due to their minimal contributions toward the failure of the overall system. 
The other is that the reliability of the components follows Weibull distribution. The detailed 
reliability characteristics of the major components are given in Table 3 attained from the collected 
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field data.   
 
5.2 System reliability computation 
 
The reliability evaluation based on FTA usually includes the qualitative and quantitative evaluation. 
On the qualitative front, minimum cut sets are used to identify the crucial components in the overall 
system through the BDD algorithm and analysis on the importance of components. With the 
quantitative evaluation, the reliability is calculated by Eq.(3).   
 
From the structure and analysis from the minimum cut sets, component failures in the catenary 
system are more likely to lead to the malfunction of the overall supply section. On the other hand, 
component failures in the transformer substations have relatively lesser consequences on the overall 
supply section for the redundancies and protections between the components. In quantitative 
evaluation, the fitting functions of the reliability are mathematically attained as below.   
Catenaries system:   4.66exp
38.71
tR t
        
  
Substations:   13.52exp
150.0
tR t
        
 
Overall Supply section:   4.66exp
38.71
tR t
        
 
 
The MTTF of the supply section in this case study is calculated as below. 
 
0
35.40MTTF R t dt
   months 
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5.3 Importance of components and sensitivity analysis 
 
Table 4 shows the orders of importance, as defined in Table 1, of the primary subsystems. From the 
results, the catenary system has a higher importance than other subsystems in every definition. This 
implies that the catenary system plays the most crucial role in keeping the supply section reliable 
and it requires the most attention in maintenance.    
 
Table 5 lists the order of importance of the major components in XD transformer substation under 
different definitions. The events in Table 5 are those more likely to lead to failures of transformer 
substations. The corresponding components are Scott transformers (C1, C2), current mutual 
inductors (C3, C5), ambipolar auto-switches (C7, C33, C34), ambipolar manual switches (C20), 
autotransformers (C37, C38) and three-phase switches (C41, C42). 
 
To go further, the reliability sensitivity analysis of components is introduced. The components are 
categorised into three groups as follows: C1, C2, C3, C5, C7, C20, C33, C34, C37, C38, C41, C42 
in Group 1, where the components are in the top five of the importance orders; the remaining 
components, C9, C13, C14, C18, C19, C24, C25, C26, C29, C30 in Group 2. All components, 
including all in Group1 and Group2, go to Group 3.   
 
The details of the analysis are listed in Table 6. It is clear that the reliability of XD transformer 
substation is more vulnerable to failure in Group 1. It is therefore more effective to improve the 
reliability of those sensitive components. 
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For the catenary system, the same calculation and analysis is also carried out. The orders of 
importance of the major components are listed in Table 7. From this table, contact wires are the 
most important components with different definitions of importance. Table 8 shows the sensitivity 
of the catenary system’s MTTF when its component mean lifetimes are changed. Of the five 
different components, the reliability of the catenary system is the most sensitive to that of the 
contact wires. In other words, if the lifetime of contact wires is prolonged through proper 
maintenance activities, the catenary system’s MTTF will be significantly improved.     
 
In addition to the above analysis, another useful observation can be drawn from Tables 6 and 8. The 
increase of the overall system’s MTTF is always not as significant as their decrease when the mean 
lifetime of components is changed. For example, for the components in Group 1 in Table 6, when 
the mean lifetime of components is increased by 40%, the improvement of the overall system’s 
MTTF only reaches 13.43%. However, when the mean lifetime of components is reduced by 40%, 
the deterioration of the overall system’s MTTF is 38.81%. The result thus suggests one way to keep 
a railway power supply system highly reliable. It is to prolong the lifetime of those sensitive 
components as much as possible in the manufacturing processes and to maintain those sensitive 
components more regularly.  
 
5.4 Reliability improvement and cost analysis under maintenance 
 
Maintenance at regular intervals improves the reliability of the railway power supply system. 
However, more maintenance also leads to increasing cost. Thus, analysis on reliability improvement 
and cost under maintenance is necessary. In this section, the periodic PM is employed (i.e. the 
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maintenance interval of the system, it , is kept constant). The reliability of the system under 
maintenance is calculated by Eq.(3) and Eq.(9). From the results in Sections 5.1, the MTTF of the 
system is approximately 35 months. Thus, the maintenance intervals in this study are respectively 
set to 40, 35, 30, 25, 20 and 15 months. The reliability distributions under different maintenance 
intervals are given in Figure 8. The results indicate that the shorter the maintenance intervals are, 
the more the reliability of the case system is improved. In addition, the maintenance cost is 
calculated by Eq.(10), where $500rC  , $2000rpC  , $100mC  , $20000lc   and 
0.05monthim  . The results in Table 9 indicate that the cost increases with the shortening of 
maintenance intervals.  
 
By further analysis, simple reliability functions may be drawn from the scattered dot lines in Figure 
8. The mean reliability of the system under maintenance, R , can be calculated by Eq.(11). From 
Table 9, the MTTF and the mean reliability of the system increase with smaller maintenance 
intervals. Reliability operators are then able to take a quantitative evaluation of the trade-off 
between reliability and cost. It is also possible for the operators to take maintenance down-time and 
system availability in the consideration of planning. 
  
6 Conclusions 
 
FTA is a graphical tool with logical operators and it is useful for reliability analysis of large-scale 
systems. FTA may also be applied to model a railway power supply system and evaluate its 
reliability qualitatively and quantitatively. The inter-connecting components in the power supply 
systems, which have their individual functions and reliability, are mapped to a fault tree. The BDD 
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method is introduced to calculate the minimum cut sets and their disjoint sum of the fault tree so 
that the system reliability can be evaluated qualitatively and quantitatively. The importance of 
components and sensitivity analysis are also presented to identify the most critical components and 
their impacts on the overall reliability. Finally, a reliability model which incorporates the effects of 
maintenance activities is used to analyse the improvement of reliability of the overall system by 
maintenance with regular intervals. 
 
A fault tree has been established based on a practical railway power supply system in China with 
the proposed approach. Through the importance and sensitivity analysis of the components in the 
railway power supply system, prolonging the lifetime of the sensitive components in the 
manufacturing process can stall the deterioration of the reliability of the overall system. The 
reliability and maintenance cost of the railway power supply system under the different regular 
intervals are also investigated and the results show that frequent maintenance activities improve the 
reliability of the system but inevitably lead to higher maintenance cost. The balance between 
reliability improvement and maintenance cost is crucial to ensure the availability and 
cost-effectiveness of the operation of a railway system. The results are useful for railway engineers 
to schedule the maintenance activities. 
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Appendix:  
 
The reliability model considering maintenance activities and evaluation method on maintenance 
cost mentioned in Section 4.2 are described in the appendix. The notations are first introduced as 
below. 
( )jR t : reliability function of the overall system in j th maintenance interval; 
0R : initial reliability of the overall system, without generality 0 1R  ; 
it : period of time at i th maintenance interval; 
1m : improvement factor of extinct conditions of failures, such as failures by contamination, 
bad connection, etc, 10 1m  ; 
2m : improvement factors of instinct conditions of failures, such as failures due to overload, 
short circuit, etc, 20 1m  ; 
( )R t : reliability function of the overall system without consideration of maintenance activities, 
which may be evaluated by the FTA approach. 
pt : period of time at maintenance interval of periodic PM; 
N : number of maintenance intervals; 
    (.)h : failure rate of system defined as    lnd R th t
dt
  ; 
im : maintenance time of system at i th maintenance interval; 
(.)floor : integer not more than a presumed value, 
1  1
( )
0  0 1
if x
floor x
if x
    ; 
    rC : cost of repair at each maintenance interval; 
    mC : cost of each preventive maintenance activity; 
    rpC : cost of replacement; 
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lc : loss cost of unit time due to preventive maintenance; 
T : a given time span within the system lifetime. 
   
The reliability model without the consideration of maintenance time, pt , is expressed as Eq.(9). 
The general methods on calculating the improvement factors, 1m  and 2m , were given in a 
previous study [29]. For railway power supply, two types of maintenance activities are commonly 
carried out. One is regular maintenance when 1 1.0m   and 2 0m  , the other is replacement when 
1 1.0m   and 2 1.0m  .  
  1
1 1 1 1
2 0
1 1 11 1 1
0 , 1
( ) 1( ) ( ) , 2 
j j j j j
j
i i i i i
i i ii i
R t t t j
R t
R t m R R t R t t t t t j
m
   
   
                               
  (9)  
 
Maintenance cost under periodic PM is calculated by Eq.(10). The first term is the cost of repair 
during lifetime defined by the probability of system failure. The second and third ones denote the 
cost of preventive maintenance or replacement at intervals. The fourth term is the opportunity cost 
of interrupting operation for maintenance intervals.   
    1 1 11 2 1 20
1 1 1 11
1p
N N N Nt
r m rp l i
i i i i
tC C h dt floor m m C floor m m C c m
m
  
   
              (10) 
 
In addition, there is also another indicator, in addition to MTTF, to evaluate the reliability of railway 
power supply systems. It is the mean reliability during a given time and defined by Eq.(11). 
                 
0
1 TR R t dt
T
                           (11) 
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Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 (a)  Event symbols 
 
 
(b) An example of fault Tree 
 
Fig 1 Events symbols in a fault tree and its example 
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Fig. 2 Schematic diagram for an AC supply system 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Fault tree for unavailable power supply to the railway power section 
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by the failures of the Scott transformers 
C1, C2 and associated components, such 
as C 3 or C7 or C5 or C9 
G6 G7
E1 E7E3 E2 E9E5
G47G8
E33 E38E34 E42 E37 E41
G12 G11
G21 E33
G13
E13
G33 G32
E14 E30E26E20 E34E19 E25
E18 E29E24 E2 E9E5
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The unavailable power provision 
caused by the failures of the Scott 
transformer C1 and some associated
components, such as C3, C7, C14, and 
so on
The unavailable power provision caused 
by the failures of the Scott transformer 
C2 and some associated components, 
such as C5, C9, C19, and so on
The unavailable power provision 
caused by the failures of some 
connected components between 
transformers, such as C13, C14, C18, 
and so on
G1
The unavailable power provision caused 
by the failures of the auto-transformer 
C37 and associated components, such as 
C33, C34, C38, C41, C42
G2
The unavailable power provision caused 
by the failures of the Scott transformer 
C1 and some associated components, 
such as C3, C7, C14, and so on
G3
The unavailable power provision caused 
by the failures of the Scott transformer 
C2 and some associated components, 
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G22 E33
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The unavailable power provision caused 
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Fig. 4 Fault tree for unavailable supply of a transformer substation to catenary system 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Fault tree for unavailable supply of catenary system to trains 
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Fig. 6 BDD associated with example fault tree in Figure 2 
 
 
Fig. 7 Traction supply sections of the JingGuang mainline railway in China 
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Fig. 8 Improvement of reliability of the case system under different maintenance intervals 
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Tables: 
 
Table 1 Definitions of reliability importance of components and MCSs 
Names Definitions Illustrations 
Birnbaum’s 
importance 
  (1 , ( )) (0 , ( ))i i iI t g F t g F t   
(1 , ( ))ig F t  and (0 , ( ))ig F t  respectively denote the 
probability that top event occurs when event i  occurs or not 
by time t .  
Criticality 
importance 
   (1 , ( )) (0 , ( )) ( )
( ( ))
i i i
i
g F t g F t F t
I t
g F t
  
( )iF t  is the probability that event i  occurs by time t ; 
( ( ))g F t  is the probability that the top event occurs by time 
t ; others are same as above. 
Vesely-Fussell’s 
importance 
  ( ( ))
( ( ))
i
i
g F tI t
g F t
  
( ( ))ig F t = Prob ( ) 1ik q   , ( )ik q  is the Boolean 
indicator variable for the union of all cut sets that contain basic 
event i ; others are same as above. 
Barlow-Proschan’s 
importance 
    
1
(1, ( )) (0 , ( )) ( )
(1 , ( )) (0 , ( )) ( )
i i i
i n
j j j
j
g F t g F t f t
I t
g F t g F t f t



 ( )if t  is the density function of ( )iF t ; others are same as 
above. 
Cut Set Importance  
( )
( ( ))
s
i
i K
i
F t
I t
g F t


 
( )
s
i
i K
F t

  is the probability of cut set sK ; others are same as 
above. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Major components involved in a feeding system 
Component type Labels 
Scott transformer (110kV/55kV) C1,C2 
Current mutual inductors (110kV,2*300/5A) C3,C4,C5,C6 
Ambipolar auto-switches (55kV,1250A) C7,C8,C9,C10,C27,C28,C29,C30,C31,C32,C33,C34 
Ambipolar manual switches (55kV,1250A) C11,C12,C13,C14,C15,C16,C17,C18,C19,C20 
Circuit breakers (55kV,1250A) C21,C22,C23,C24,C25,C26 
Three-phase manual switches C39,C40,C41,C42 
Autotransformers (55kV/27.5kV) C35,C36,C37,C38 
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Table 3 Reliability functions of components for AC power section 
Components 
Number of 
components 
Expected 
lifetime/month 
SD of expected 
lifetime 
Reliability distribution 
Scott transformer 4 162 12.00 
16.60
exp
167.25
tR
        
 
Current mutual 
inductors 
24 168 43.34 
4.41
exp
184.32
tR
        
 
Ambipolar 
auto-switches 
37 168 18.67 
10.88
exp
175.98
tR
        
 
Ambipolar 
manual switches 
54 168 17.45 
11.70
exp
175.48
tR
        
 
Circuit breakers 22 168 25.64 
7.75
exp
178.67
tR
        
 
Three-phase 
manual switches 
23 162 25.58 
7.47
exp
172.61
tR
        
 
Autotransformers 20 160 33.04 
5.60
exp
173.13
tR
        
 
Contact wires 362.058km 131 32.83 
4.55
exp
143.47
tR
        
 
Messenger wires  362.058km 167 9.81 
21.12
exp
171.32
tR
        
 
Insulators 43818pieces 165 36.22 
5.25
exp
179.21
tR
        
 
Central anchors  209entries 166 21.72 
9.14
exp
175.18
tR
        
 
Tension providers 461groups 160 28.50 
6.57
exp
171.62
tR
        
 
 
 
Table 4 Order of importance of subsystems under different definitions 
Failure events 
Birnbaum’s 
importance 
Criticality 
importance 
Vesely-Fussell’s 
importance 
Barlow-Proschan’s 
importance 
Catenaries 37.6025 37.6025 146.00 71.999 
WLB DS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WLB CB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WLB US 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WLB AT 0.0016746 0.00 0.00037587 0.000038725 
XZ AT 0.0016746 0.00 0.00037587 0.000038725 
Down-track 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Up-track  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5 Order of importance of major components in XD transformer substations 
Order 
Birnbaum Criticality  Vesely-Fussell Barlow-Proschan Minimum cut sets 
Events Impor Events Impor Events Impor Events Impor Sets Impor 
1 E33 14.017 E3 100.007 E1 212.765 E3 49.119 E33,E42 108.831 
2 E37 13.937 E5 99.826 E3 120.127 E5 46.053 E2,E7 34.247 
3 E41 12.923 E37 29.138 E5 119.81 E1 33.752 E3,E5 22.730 
4 E3 11.500 E38 25.605 E37 53.344 E37 14.923 E1,E5 22.730 
5 E5 11.205 E41 11.996 E38 47.852 E38 13.279 E20,E34 19.756 
 
 
 
Table 6 Sensitivity of the transformer substation's MTTF when components' mean lifetime is changed 
Mean lifetime of 
components 
MTTF of transformer 
substation in Group 1 
MTTF of transformer 
substation in Group 2 
MTTF of transformer 
substation in Group 3 
140% 163.743(113.43%) 148.207(102.67%) 202.100(140.00%) 
130% 162.306(112.43%) 147.734(102.34%) 187.664(130.00%) 
120% 159.381(110.41%) 147.223(101.99%) 173.228(120.00%) 
110% 153.671(106.45%) 146.271(101.33%) 158.793(110.00%) 
100% 144.357(100.00%) 144.357 (100.00%) 144.357 (100.00%) 
90% 131.717(91.24%) 139.011(96.30%) 129.921(90.00%) 
80% 117.672(81.51%) 128.846(89.23%) 115.486(80.00%) 
70% 103.795(71.90%) 114.839(79.55%) 101.050(70.00%) 
60% 88.333(61.19%) 99.19(68.71%) 86.614(60.00%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Order of importance of major components in the catenary system 
Components 
Birnbaum’s 
importance 
Criticality 
importance 
Vesely-Fussell’s 
importance 
Barlow-Proschan’s 
Importance 
Contact wires 34.4010 1.0593×10-1 6.0061×10-1 1.8306×10-1 
Messenger wires 34.3813 3.0894×10-12 4.9419×10-8 1.3913×10-8 
Insulators 34.3837 8.1948×10-3 1.0440×10-1 2.3506×10-2 
Central anchors 34.3813 1.3722×10-5 2.4131×10-3 4.3690×10-4 
 31
Tension providers 34.3817 9.2455×10-4 3.5053×10-2 6.4955×10-3 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Sensitivity of the catenary system's MTTF to component mean lifetimes 
Mean lifetime of 
components 
MTTF of  
contact wires 
MTTF of messenger 
wires 
MTTF of 
insulators 
MTTF of  
central anchors 
MTTF of  Tension 
providers 
140% 44.750(126.48%) 35.381(100.00%) 36.091(102.01%) 35.384(100.01%) 35.509(100.36%) 
130% 42.954(121.40%) 35.381(100.00%) 36.017(101.80%) 35.384(100.01%) 35.499(100.33%) 
120% 40.789(115.28%) 35.381(100.00%) 35.899(101.46%) 35.384(100.01%) 35.481(100.28%) 
110% 38.254(108.12%) 35.381(100.00%) 35.706(100.92%) 35.383(100.01%) 35.448(100.19%) 
100% 35.381(100.00%) 35.381(100.00%) 35.381(100.00%) 35.381(100.00%) 35.381(100.00%) 
90% 32.231(91.10%) 35.381(100.00%) 34.822(98.42%) 35.376(99.99%) 35.244(99.61%) 
80% 28.877(81.62%) 35.381(100.00%) 33.855(95.68%) 35.361(99.94%) 34.942(98.76%) 
70% 25.387(71.75%) 35.381(100.00%) 32.218(91.06%) 35.306(99.79%) 34.263(96.84%) 
60% 21.816(61.66%) 35.381(100.00%) 29.631(83.75%) 35.088(99.17%) 32.778(92.64%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 Comparisons of the system reliability at different maintenance intervals 
Maintenance 
interval 
Fitting reliability 
function 
R-square MTTF(months) 
Mean reliability 
R  
Maintenance cost 
($) 
No maintenance 
4.66
exp
38.71
tR
        
 1.0000 35.40 0.2150 Null 
40 months 
1.732
exp
51.2
tR
        
 0.9625 44.63 0.2789 5630.1 
35 months 
1.353
exp
70.4
tR
        
 0.9723 63.49 0.3859 5673.7 
30 months 
1.218
exp
108.1
tR
        
 0.9835 100.34 0.5328 6263.1 
25 months 
1.15
exp
190.4
tR
        
 0.9901 180.21 0.6969 6992.0 
20 months 
1.102
exp
400.2
tR
        
 0.9939 384.93 0.8396 7884.3 
15 months 
1.071
exp
1077
tR
        
 0.9966 1047.75 0.9343 11061.0 
 
 
